Sunday Gabriel Ehindero v. Federal Republic of Nigeria [2018] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1612) 301 at 326, paras. B-C, per Eko, JSC:

“On the whole, I find no substance in this appeal. It is unfortunate that, in spite of the decision of this Court in A. G. Ondo State v. A. G. Federation (supra) on facts almost on all fours with the facts of the instant appeal, this interlocutory appeal was fought doggedly from the High Court of the FCT to this Court. In the end, notwithstanding the huge resources, time, money and energy inclusive, wasted, this case has to go back to the zero or starting point at the High Court  of the FCT for the Appellant, as the accused person, to face his trial.”

Notes:

The Appellant was the former Inspector General Police of Nigeria. He and one other are facing trial on charges bordering on alleged conspiracy to criminally convert public funds and criminal conversion of public funds to the tune of over N16 Million being interests generated from two deposit accounts.

The alleged master-plan orchestrated by the Appellant and his alleged co-conspirator was birthed following the donation of over N500 Million by the Bayelsa State Government to the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) to enable the NPF purchase equipment for proper policing of Bayelsa State. The Appellant and the 2nd accused person allegedly agreed to place and did place the funds in fixed deposit accounts and same ultimately yielded interests of over N16 Million. The then President of Nigeria directed the Appellant to transfer the funds donated by Bayelsa State to the Federal Ministry of Police Affairs to make the necessary purchases. The Appellant allegedly delayed his compliance with the presidential directive until after the maturity of the fixed deposits. Upon maturity, the Appellant allegedly caused the transfer of only the principal sum without the interests earned from the fixed deposits.

It was the above alleged conduct that necessitated the filing of criminal charges by the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) against the Appellant at the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja. The Appellant’s Counsel, Dr. Alex A. Izinyon, SAN, filed a preliminary objection on behalf of the Appellant challenging the jurisdiction of the High Court of the FCT to entertain the matter, the competence of the charges, and the powers of the ICPC to prosecute the case. The learned trial Judge dismissed the objections and an appeal to the Court of Appeal suffered the same fate of dismissal.

The Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court where three issues were canvassed:

“1) Whether the High Court of the FCT has the requisite jurisdiction to try the appellant for the offences created by the Corrupt Practices and other related Offences Act, 2000.

2) Whether the charges and the Proofs of Evidence before the trial Court disclose any prima facie case against the appellant to warrant the leave granted and the arraignment of the appellant for the offences charged.

3) Having regards to the provisions of Section 6(a), 26(2) and 61(1) of the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act, 2000, whether the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and its officers can initiate and prosecute the appellant for offences under the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act, 2000.”

On the first issue, the Appellant’s Counsel argued that the case against the Appellant touches on an item of revenue accruable to the Federal Government of Nigeria and as such, only the Federal High Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the criminal case by virtue of Section 251(1)(a) and (3) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended).

The Supreme Court had no difficulty in discountenancing the argument. It held that there is nothing in the Constitution that confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court to determine criminal causes and matters in respect of the civil matters for which exclusive jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution under Section 251(1).  Both the Federal High Court and other High Courts have concurrent jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the High Court of the FCT had jurisdiction to entertain the case. This is settled.

On the second issue, the Appellant’s Counsel argued that the proofs of evidence and the charges disclosed no prima facie case (i.e. ‘no case on the face of it’). The Supreme Court considered this and concluded that ‘Each charge is also clear as to what it alleges and the offence charged. The proofs of evidence (31) and the charges, if juxtaposed against the provisions of the ICPC Act, under which the charges have been laid, clearly disclose a prima facie case to warrant the trial to proceed.” What is overwhelming is that, it is trite that the requirement of disclosure of a prima facie case is not same as proof beyond reasonable doubt. The proofs of evidence linked the Appellant to the crimes alleged to have been committed by him. It never meant the offences were thereby already proved. There was no sustainable basis for the argument supplied. Yet, it was supplied anyways.

On the third issue, the Appellant’s Counsel challenged the powers of ICPC to prosecute the Appellant even on the face of already decided Supreme Court case on the point. In doing away with the contention, the apex Court swiped on the Appellant and the Appellant’s Counsel thus:

“It is unfortunate that the Appellant persisted in his erroneous view that the ICPC cannot, under Section 26(2) of its enabling Act, initiate, and maintain criminal proceedings against any person, including the Appellant herein, for an offence under the said Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 (i.e. the ICPC Act), in spite of the loud allusions by the 1st Respondent and the learned trial Judge to the undoubted and authoritative pronouncement on it by this Court in A. G. Ondo State v. A. G. Federation & Ors (2002) 6 SC. (Pt. 1) 1; (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt. 772) 222. All the senior counsel to the Appellant needed to do, as an officer in the temple of justice, is simply picking the decision of the full panel of this Court in  A. G. Ondo State v. A. G. Federation & Ors (supra), read it and advise his client accordingly.”

So, notwithstanding that the issues canvassed by the Appellant are all settled and there was absolutely nothing to compel a departure from the current state of the law, the Appellant’s Counsel (whose brilliance remains undoubted), with the greatest respect, laboured to ‘unsettle’ the issues by making series of technical and definitional arguments to which the Supreme Court had to consult the dictionaries severally and also test its knowledge of grammar. At the end of the day, the labour was in vain. But that was not all.  Huge resources were expended, great deal of time and energy were wasted, all at an interlocutory stage!

The point needs to be made for the umpteenth time that this is no advocacy! But even if it were to be so, then, this is not at all the kind of advocacy that ministers in the temple of justice are encouraged to embark on and emulate.